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ABSTRACT 
 
Information technology is evolving at an unprecedented rate; new 
forms of communication appear so often that it is difficult to keep 
track of them all. This presents a difficult problem for attorneys, who 
must carefully consider whether using new technology to communicate 
with clients is consistent with the duty of confidentiality. Google’s 
Gmail scans the content of e-mails to generate targeted advertising, a 
controversial practice that raises questions about whether its users 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The New York Bar 
responded to this issue in Opinion 820, which states that using an  
e-mail provider that scans the e-mail content to display relevant 
advertising does not violate a lawyer’s duty of client confidentiality. 
This article explains the controversial nature of Gmail, the evolution 
of e-mail in ethics opinions, and Opinion 820’s content and 
implications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of free e-mail providers has become virtually ubiquitous in 
electronic communication. But while the majority of e-mail users do 
not directly pay for Internet-based services, these services do have the 
potential to generate income. Many e-mail providers recoup some of 
their costs by placing advertisements inside the e-mail viewing window, 
or even within the e-mail itself. 
Some of the more successful e-mail providers have found ways to 
target ads to the characteristics of a particular user, which makes the 
ads more valuable to advertisers than mere random placement. Most 
providers gather targeting information by monitoring user activities 
within the providers’ domains,1 such as which ads users click on, 
which areas of the providers’ domain they visit, or even which other 
Web sites they visit.2 But one e-mail provider, Google’s Gmail, has 
attracted controversy by gathering information for targeted advertising 
with software that scans the actual content of e-mails.  
Attorneys, through their duty of confidentiality, must ensure that 
their communications remain private and confidential.3 Due to the 
popularity of Gmail, attorneys will likely be corresponding with some 
clients who use Gmail addresses. Although a number of states have 
issued ethics opinions on the impact of the duty of confidentiality on 
e-mail,4 the New York State Bar is the first to consider Gmail’s practice 
                                                                                                             
1 In this context, the term “domain” refers to a lower level domain of the 
Domain Name System (DNS). The three-letter extension such as “.com” or “.net” is a 
top-level domain, and lower level domains are any word that appears to the left of the 
extension, such as “Google” or “Yahoo.” 
2 For a summary of how targeted online advertisements are generally gathered 
and delivered, see Testimony of Edward W. Felten, Behavioral Advertising: Industry 
Practices and Consumers’ Expectations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce the Subcomm. On Commc’ns, Tech. and the Internet, and the Subcomm. On 
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. (2009) (June 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~felten/testimony_18june2009.pdf. In addition to 
email providers, many web portals and social networking services collect user data for 
targeted advertisements. 
3 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
4 So far, at least 22 states have issued ethics opinions regarding the use of e-mail 
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of actually scanning the text of e-mail messages. The New York opinion 
concludes that using e-mail services that scan content to generate 
targeted advertising does not breach the duty of confidentiality so long 
as the information is not reviewed by humans.5  
This Article analyzes the New York Bar opinion. It first describes 
how Gmail conducts targeted advertising. It then reviews the history of 
bar opinions related to new communications technologies and exp-
lains how they have evolved. Next, it examines the nature of the 
controversy over Gmail. Last, it explains how the New York Bar 
opinion resolved those issues and discusses key implications of the 
opinion. 
 
I. GMAIL AND TARGETED ADVERTISING 
 
The New York State Bar Opinion directly implicates Gmail, a 
popular Web-based e-mail service run by Google. Gmail is a free, Web-
based e-mail service with a very large storage capacity.6 Gmail is 
currently the third most popular e-mail provider, with over 113 million 
users worldwide.7 With such a large user base, it is likely that attorneys 
                                                                                                             
and the duty of confidentiality. Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm. Op. 98-2 (1998); St. 
Bar Ariz. Comm. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Adv. Op. 97-04 (1997); Conn. Bar Ass’n 
Ethics Op. 99-52 (1999); D.C. Bar Op. 281 (1998); Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 00-4 
(2000); Ill. St. Bar Ass’n Adv. Op. 96-10 (1997); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. Prof’l Ethics 
Conduct Op. 97-01 (1997); Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. E-403 (1997); Me. Prof. Ethics 
Comm. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Ethics Op. 195 (2008); Mass. Bar Assoc. Comm. 
Prof’l Ethics Adv. Op. 00-1 (1998); Md. Law. Prof. Resp. Bd. Op. No. 19 (1992); 
Minn. Law. Prof. Resp. Bd. Ethics Op. 19 (1999); Mo. St. Bar Legal Ethics Counsel 
Adv. Op. 970230 (1997); N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics Op. 820 (2008) 
N.C. St. Bar Ethics Op. RPC 215 (1995); St. Bar Ass’n of N.D. Ethics Comm. Op. 
No. 97-09 (1997); Ohio Bd. Com. Griev. Disp. Adv. Op. 99-2 (1999); Pa. Bar Ass’n 
Comm. Ethics Prof. Resp. Op. 97-130 (1997); S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm. Op. 97-
08 (1997); Sup. Ct. Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. Adv. Op. 98-A-650(a) (1998); Utah St. 
Bar. Ethics Op. 00-01 (2000); Vt. Adv. Ethics Op. 97-5 (1997). Hereinafter, these 
opinions will be referred to as Advisory Opinions (Adv. Op.) or Ethics Opinions 
(Ethics Op.). 
5 NY Ethics Op. 820 (2008). 
6 Gmail launched with two gigabytes of storage capacity per user. Currently, the 
storage capacity is over seven gigabytes, and it is still growing. 
7 Chua Hian Hou, Gmail Users Locked Out, THE STRAITS TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_342 
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will be expected to send e-mail correspondence to Gmail accounts. 
Gmail generates revenue by displaying advertisements next to the 
content of the messages. In order to tailor these advertisements to the 
Gmail user, Google’s software scans the content of an open e-mail for 
relevant text and then displays advertisements related to that text.8 For 
instance, if a Gmail user opens an e-mail about an upcoming trip to 
Chicago, the web interface might display ads for hotels and restaurants 
in Chicago. The advertisements are entirely text-based, which mini-
mizes both the effect on the user and bandwidth usage. 
Gmail’s process of scanning e-mail content and matching it to 
advertisements is entirely automated.9 Humans are not directly 
involved with the process, and the information gleaned from the  
e-mails is not disclosed to any third parties, including the advertisers.10 
The ad content is dynamically generated when an e-mail is opened, 
meaning that ad content is not attached to particular accounts.11 
Although Google’s patent on the technology covers the ability to create 
logs of user profiles, which can include keywords and potentially 
sensitive data,12 Google’s Vice President of Engineering stated that 
Gmail does not use this feature.13 
Automated scanning of e-mail content is not unique to Gmail. 
Virtually every e-mail service conducts similar automated scanning for 
many purposes, including “spam filtering, virus detection, search, 
spellchecking, forwarding, auto-responding, flagging urgent messages, 
converting incoming e-mail into cell phone text messages, automatic 
saving and sorting into folders, converting text URLs to clickable links, 
and reading messages to the blind.”14 The primary difference between 
                                                                                                             
818.html. The other top e-mail providers are Hotmail (283 million) and Yahoo (274 
million). 
8 Google, About Gmail, Jan. 2007, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about 
_privacy.html#scanning_email (on file with the author). 
9 Id. 
10 Google, About Gmail, Jan. 2007, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about 
_privacy.html#targeted_ads (on file with the author). 
11 Id. 
12 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Gmail Privacy Page, Aug. 8, 2004, 
http://epic.org/privacy/gmail/faq.html#23. 
13 Kim Zetter, Free Email With a Steep Price?, WIRED, April 1, 2004, http:// 
www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/04/62917. 
14 Google, About Gmail, Jan. 2007, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about 
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Gmail’s targeted advertising technology and these other uses is that 
Gmail’s scanning generates income from third-party advertisers, while 
the other uses are typically billed as services for the user. 
 
II. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
The legal ethics community has been cautious about the ability of 
lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of communications in newly 
introduced electronic media. For example, when cell phones were first 
introduced, federal courts did not find a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their use, partially because no law directly prohibited 
interception of their signals.15 Then in 1986, Congress passed the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which made it illegal 
to intentionally intercept electronic transmissions.16 Following the 
protection of the ECPA and advances in cell phone technology from 
analog to digital transmissions, state bars found their use consistent 
with an attorney’s duty of confidentiality.17  
The American Bar Association (ABA) first considered the issue of 
e-mail confidentiality in 1986. The ABA concluded that before 
communicating client confidences over an electronic network, 
attorneys needed to obtain bar approval or make an informed opinion 
regarding the system’s reliability in maintaining confidentiality.18 
Similarly, the initial state bar ethics opinions held that unfettered use 
of e-mail was not consistent with the duty of confidentiality. A 1995 
ethics opinion from South Carolina required express waivers from the 
                                                                                                             
_privacy.html#targeted_ads (on file with the author). 
15 See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that cell phone 
communications are not protected by the Wiretap Act, and noting that the events in 
question occurred before the ECPA was passed). 
16 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2008). The ECPA was written to apply to cell phone 
communication, but it was amended in 1994 to apply to cordless telephone 
communication and e-mail. Mitchel L. Winick, Brian Burris & Y. Danae Bush, 
Playing I Spy with Client Confidences: Confidentiality, Privilege and Electronic Communi-
cations, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1225, 1242-1248 (2000). 
17 Mark W. Pearlstein & Jonathan D. Twombly, Cell Phones, Email, and 
Confidential Communications: Protecting Your Client’s Confidences, 46 B. B.J. 20, 21 
(2002). 
18 Winick, et al., supra note 16, at 1249. 
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clients unless confidentiality was certain,19 and a 1996 ethics opinion 
from Iowa required encryption of sensitive materials.20 After the Iowa 
opinion, no other state opinions required encryption except in 
unusual circumstances.21 Both the Iowa and South Carolina opinions 
were later amended to remove the encryption requirements.22 
In 1999, after extensively reviewing the issue, the ABA issued a 
formal opinion on e-mail confidentiality.23 The opinion analyzes risks 
associated with all modes of e-mail transmission, considers the security 
of alternative means of communication, and notes the statutory 
protections for illicitly intercepting e-mail.24 It concludes “lawyers have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all 
forms of e-mail, including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, 
despite some risk of interception and disclosure.”25 The opinion states 
that while some state bars have required express consent from clients, 
“more recent opinions reflecting lawyers’ greater understanding of the 
technology involved approve the use of unencrypted Internet e-mail 
without express client consent.”26 The opinion also recommends, but 
does not require, that attorneys use encryption in sensitive e-mail 
communications.27 
 
                                                                                                             
19 S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm. Op. 94-27 (1995). 
20 Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. Prof’l Ethics Conduct Op. 95-30 (1996). 
21 Winick, et al., supra note 16, at 1253. Some opinions, such as the opinion 
from Connecticut, describe these as being circumstances “which would place a lawyer 
on notice that there is a greater than ordinary risk of interception or unauthorized 
disclosure (such as an e-mail “mailbox” which is accessible to persons other than the 
intended recipient) . . .” Conn. Ethics Op. 99-52 (1999). 
22 See Iowa Ethics Op. 96-01 (1996); S.C. Adv. Op. 97-08 (1997). The amended 
Iowa opinion now provides that “with sensitive material to be transmitted on e-mail, 
counsel must have written acknowledgment by client of the risk of violation of DR 4-
101 which acknowledgment includes consent for communication thereof . . . or it 
must be encrypted or protected by password/fire-wall or other generally accepted 
equivalent security system.” 
23 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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III. PRIVACY CONCERNS SURROUNDING GMAIL 
 
When Google introduced its Gmail service in March 2004, it was 
met with widespread distrust from privacy advocates. Within one 
month, 31 privacy and civil liberties organizations published an open 
letter to Google decrying the practice of scanning e-mails for targeted 
advertisements.28 The letter argues that scanning e-mails “violates the 
implicit trust of an e-mail service provider,” that Google’s policies 
lacked clarity, and that the scanning set a precedent for reduced 
expectations for privacy.29 Regarding the actual privacy of the content, 
the letter states that “a computer system, with its greater storage, 
memory, and associative ability than a human’s, could be just as 
invasive as a human listening to the communications, if not more 
so.”30 The controversy was so great that it even provoked legislation in 
California.31  
Numerous technology and business advocates—and even some 
prominent privacy advocates—criticized the outcry against Gmail.32 
Those organizations maintained that the harm envisioned by Gmail’s 
opposition was largely hypothetical, Gmail was operating within the 
bounds of the law, and there was no real threat that private 
information would be divulged to humans, which was the central 
                                                                                                             
28 Privacyrights.org, Thirty-One Privacy and Civil Liberties Organizations 
Urge Google to Suspend Gmail, April 6, 2004, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ 
GmailLetter.htm. The letter acknowledges that the scanning technology is essentially 
as invasive as scanning for spam or viruses, but insists that displaying ads “is 
fundamentally different than removing harmful viruses and unwanted spam.” 
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 In the same month that the open letter was issued, April of 2004, California 
State Senator Liz Figueroa introduced SB1822, Ban on Secretly Scrutinizing E-Mail 
Messages for Targeted Advertising. Grant Yang, Stop the Abuse of Gmail, 2005 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. 14, 23 (2005). The bill would allow e-mail providers to derive 
information from the content of their communications, but would prohibit using it 
for the provider’s marketing purposes. Thus, scanning for antivirus or spam removal 
would be legal, but Gmail’s scanning for targeted advertising would not be. The 
legislation was ultimately abandoned.  
32 Brad Templeton, Privacy Subtleties of Gmail, http://www.templetons.com/ 
brad/gmail.html (last visited May 2, 2010). Brad Templeton is the chairman of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
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concern of both privacy groups and attorney confidentiality.33 
Nevertheless, the controversy has followed Gmail and may have been 
the impetus for the New York State Bar to consider the implications 
on attorney-client confidentiality. 
 
IV. THE NEW YORK STATE BAR OPINION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
 
Opinion 820 starts by pointing out that a previous New York State 
Bar Opinion found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the use of 
unencrypted e-mail.34 The prior opinion states that a lawyer may not 
transmit client confidences by e-mail where there is a heightened risk 
of interception, and that a lawyer “who uses internet e-mail must also 
stay abreast of this evolving technology to assess any changes in the 
likelihood of interception.”35 Hence, Opinion 820 asks whether 
Gmail’s scanning for targeted advertising presents a heightened risk as 
a new technology. Although Gmail is never specifically named, the 
opinion refers to “the particular e-mail provider’s published privacy 
policies,” implying a focus on Gmail.36 The opinion observes that 
according to those privacy policies, no humans will be exposed to the 
e-mail content, and therefore concludes that the risks to confidentiality 
                                                                                                             
33 See Nicole A. Wong, Google’s Gmail and Privacy Policy, 797 PRAC. L. INST./ 
PAT. 263 (2004). The article consists of exerts from prominent publications and 
organizations complied by an attorney for Google that support Gmail’s privacy policy 
and technology. 
34 N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics Op. 709 (1998).  
35 Id. A number of other state e-mail confidentiality opinions have similar 
caveats to their permission that could be grounds for later exceptions under 
particular circumstances. See, e.g., DC Ethics Op. 281 (1998) (“absent special 
factors”); Mass. Adv. Op. 00-1 (1998) (use of e-mail “does not, in most instances, 
constitute a violation…”) (emphasis added); Md. Ethics Op. 19 (1999) (“precautions 
taken by a lawyer depend on the circumstances”); Me. Ethics Op. 195 (2008) 
(“reasonable judgment may require additional safeguards depending on the 
circumstances); Tenn. Adv. Op. 98-A-650(a) (“unless unusual circum-stances require 
enhanced security measures”); Utah Ethics Op. 00-01 (2000) (when “the lawyer has 
reason to believe that the risk of interception is higher, he may want to use a means 
of communication with higher security”). New York’s opinion, however, appears to 
be the only one that requires lawyers to stay abreast of evolving e-mail technology to 
reassess the issue, and hence they may be the only state that issues an opinion on 
Gmail. 
36 N.Y. Ethics Op. 820 (2008). 
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through Gmail are no greater than they are with other e-mail services 
in general.37 
After concluding that the use of Gmail does not violate an 
attorney’s duty of confidentiality, the opinion draws an analogy 
between the commercial dimension that appears to be at the heart of 
the Gmail controversy and an attorney’s use of external support 
services. The commercial dimension is the primary difference between 
Gmail’s advertising service and other common software scanning 
methods, and it appears to be the source of much of the controversy. 
New York Code provides that a lawyer may not “knowingly. . . [u]se a 
confidence or secret of a client for the advantage of the lawyer or of a 
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.”38 
According to the opinion, Gmail’s advantage from the information, 
advertising profits, is not substantially different than the profits that 
lawyer services such as litigation support companies make.39 This view 
is consistent with a recently published ABA opinion finding that it is 
acceptable to outsource technical support staff, so long as reasonable 
precautions are taken to ensure that sensitive information remains 
confidential.40 In addition, the observation addresses the heart of the 
Gmail controversy: not that personal information is used for some 
malicious purpose to the detriment of the customer, but that Gmail is 
making a profit from it. 
The opinion has several implications for the activities of attorneys 
and the general acceptance of technology by the legal community. 
First, it makes attorneys’ jobs easier by allowing them to use the third 
largest e-mail provider. Second, the opinion avoids presenting a threat 
to other automated scanning tools used by e-mail providers. The 
primary difference between Gmail’s scanning and anti-virus scanning is 
the marketing purpose. The marketing purpose has no realistic impact 
on confidentiality, so an opinion invalidating the use of Gmail would 
also cast doubt on other automated scanning tools. And finally, the 
                                                                                                             
37 Id. 
38 N.Y. Code DR 4-101(B)(3). 
39 N.Y. Ethics Op. 820 (2008). 
40 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008). 
The opinion also states that the client’s informed consent is required if their 
confidential information will be revealed to the technical support staff. 
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success of Gmail’s service suggests that other similar advertising models 
will come into existence in the future. As technology and advertising 
models continue to evolve, companies will probably come up with new 
ways to generate profit from similar targeted advertisements. These 
business models do not threaten confidentiality as long as humans are 
not exposed to the information used to generate the advertisements. 
This opinion helps to pave the way to the immediate acceptance of 
more business models like Gmail. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Like many new communications technologies, Gmail was 
controversial when first introduced due to privacy and security 
concerns. State bars reflected this reluctance to trust the security of a 
new communication technology by initially proscribing the use of  
e-mail to transmit client confidences. But after several years of using 
and becoming familiar with various e-mail services, the legal 
community is beginning to accept the risks associated with online data 
storage and mechanized scanning technology. Following these 
developments, the first state bar opinion to address the confidentiality 
of Gmail concluded that it does not pose a greater risk than e-mail 
generally. The New York State Bar’s opinion has positive implications 
for attorneys and technology, and should provide guidance to other 
states that consider this issue. 
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